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FEDERAL VENUE FOR ALIENS: THE
PRESUMPTION OF NONRESIDENCY
There is a standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental,
and of such general acceptance by all civilized countries as to
form a part of the international law of the world. The con-
dition upon which any country is entitled to measure the jus-
tice due from it to an alien by the justice which it accords to
its own citizens is that its system of law and administration
shall conform to this general standard.'
Elihu Root, 1910.
The concept of a world where aliens and citizens are treated
equally before the law is a noble one. Long after Secretary of
State Root's observation, the United Nations was created and it
formulated a commitment to the ideal of equal access to the courts
of a country for citizen and alien alike, as set forth in article 7
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.2 The problem of
enforcing such a provision should not obscure the fact that every
member nation of the United Nations has undertaken the duty
to adhere to the letter and spirit of this law.3
The United States of America joined in this pledge and has
generally treated aliens well with respect to their comparative rights
before the courts of this country.4 However, aliens do not enjoy
equal rights under the federal venue law, Title 28 U.S.C. section
1391(d): "An alien may be sued in any district."5  Section
1391(d) contrasts sharply with the general venue laws applicable
to citizens of the United States: section 1391 (a), "A civil action
wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in
which the claim arose ;''6 and section 1391 (b), "A civil action
1. The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 PROC. AM. J.
INT'L L. 16, 21 (1910).
2. G.A. Res. 216, U.N. Doe. A/810 at 79 (1948).
3. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 34 (1950);
J. CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 13 (1970).
4. Golomb, Recognition of Foreign Money Judgments: A Goal-oriented
Approach, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 604, 607 (1969). The author states that
courts in the United States generally give better recognition to foreign judgments
than that given by other countries, with the exception of England.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1970).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970).
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wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizen-
ship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defend-
ants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law."7  The different standards applied to aliens and
citizens under the federal venue laws do not reflect an abandon-
ment of the commitment made in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, but the United States has an obligation to fulfill
the goals of the Declaration to the best of its ability and the present
venue standards reflect less than a total commitment in that re-
spect.
The United States has made an international commitment
to improvement of the human condition by virtue of its member-
ship in the United Nations organization and our courts have
played a role in this commitment. The United Nations had just
begun to function when the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Oyama v. California which struck down Cali-
fornia's Alien Land Law.8 Specific reference was made by the
Court to the role which the United Nations would play in the oper-
ation of our municipal law: "this -nation has recently pledged
itself, through the United Nations Charter, to promote respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all. . .. 9
The United States would be remiss in establishing a standard
of treatment toward aliens without considering its international
obligations and there is certainly a valid question as to whether
section 1391(d) violates existing agreements. In its Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Japan"0 and Ger-
many," the United States specifically committed itself to provide
''national treatment" in regard to access to its courts for Japanese
and German nationals when they are within its borders. 2 Na-
tional treatment is defined in both treaties as "treatment accorded
within the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1970).
8. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
9. Id. at 673.
10. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Japan, April 2,
1953, 4,U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Friendship
with Japan].
11. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Germany, Octo-
ber 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839; T.I.A.S. No. 3593 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of
Friendship with Germany].
12. Treaty of Friendship with Japan, art. IV, para. 1; Treaty of Friendship
with Germany, art. VI, para. 1.
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FEDERAL VENUE FOR ALIENS
the treatment accorded therein, in like situations, to nationals,
companies, products, vessels or other objects, as the case may be,
of such Party.' 3  It is the thesis of this Comment that section
1391(d) falls short of the "national treatment" standard and is
not consistent with article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights.
I. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (d) APPLIED: POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
The federal venue law applicable to aliens' 4 differs greatly
from the general venue restrictions.' 5 For example, in a case
where federal jurisdiction is based solely upon diversity of citizen-
ship, a United States citizen who is a citizen and resident of Cali-
fornia can sue a United States citizen who is a citizen and resident
of New York in the California federal district court where plain-
tiff resides, in the New York federal district court where defendant
resides, or where the claim arose. 16 If the New York defendant
happened to be an alien, the California citizen could lay the venue
in any district of the United States.' 7 On the other hand, if the
alien sought to sue the United States citizen, he would be limited
to two places: in the federal district in the state where the defend-
ant-citizen resides (in this example California), or, where the
claim arose.'
8
Practically speaking, section 1391(d) means an alien may be
sued in any district where valid service of process can be made
upon him.'9 Thus, the possibility of discrimination arises when an
alien is served with process while temporarily in a state other than
the state in which he resides when a federal action has been filed in
that state. Venue could be properly laid in Alaska on the alien
resident of New York because an alien may be sued in any dis-
trict.2" Since the Alaska federal district court would have sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, the alien would be bound to respond or
risk a default judgment provided venue was laid there and he was
served there. However, a United States citizen would not have to
13. Treaty of Friendship with Japan, art. XXII, para. 1; Treaty of Friend-
ship with Germany, art. XXV, para. 1.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1970).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1948).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1970).
18. 28 U.S.C § 1391(b) (1970).
19. In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893); Best v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
243 F. 789 (D. Mont. 1917).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1970).
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suffer the consequence of defending a suit away from his resi-
dence and not in the district where the claim arose or where the
plaintiff resided, since he would be protected by section 1391(a)
provided he made a timely objection to the improper venue.21
The alien would be entitled to use section 1404(a) of the federal
change of venue statute22 under the above circumstances, but
this would still necessitate the hardship of responding to plaintiff's
suit in the distant forum. The mere fact that an alien might have
a remedy does not justify the continued existence of a discrimina-
tory law.
It is interesting to note that section 1391(d) coupled with sec-
tion 1404(a) creates the possibility of reverse discrimination
against United States citizens. Section 1404(a) provides for
transfer to a more convenient forum in "any other district or divi-
sion where it might have been brought. '23  Since an alien can be
sued in any district, he would appear to be within his rights in
seeking transfer to any federal district. Thus, the California citi-
zen who sued him in Alaska might be forced to respond in Maine
or Florida if the alien was successful in having the case trans-
ferred. It seems only fair that an alien should be able to make
full use of his rights under section 1404(a) if the United States
citizen can take unfair advantage of an alien's predicament under
section 1391(d). This alternative would never be necessary,
however, if resident aliens were not arbitrarily discriminated
against under section 1391(d).
Section 1391(d) embodies the long-standing rule in the
United States that an alien is presumed not to reside in any district
for venue purposes.24 Since venue was based upon citizenship or
residence, 5 it was concluded that aliens could be sued wherever
valid service of process could be made.2" This has been the weight
of authority and was so recognized when section 1391(d) was en-
acted in 1948. This basic theory was also reinforced by the fact
that prior to 1948 the federal statute for suits based upon diversity
of citizenship did not provide for suits involving aliens.2"
21. Fnn. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(1).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
23. Id.
24. Prudencio v. Hanselmann, 178 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1959); Best v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 243 F. 789 (D. Mont. 1917).
25. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, para. 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79.
26. In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893); Best v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
243 F. 789 (D. Mont. 1917).
27. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, para. 1, 24 Stat. 552-53, "[Wlhere the
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For those aliens who are in the United States briefly and do
not maintain a residence here, the present venue statute may be
appropriate. However, if the goal of equal protection for all be-
fore the law is to be achieved, venue should be restricted even
where nonresident aliens are concerned. For example, a more
reasonable law could provide that non-resident alien defendants
are subject to suit only where the claim arose or where the plaintiff
resides. However, there is no valid governmental interest for per-
mitting venue to be laid in any district when an alien has actually
established a residence in the United States. It seems logical and
necessary, therefore, to differentiate between venue requirements
for resident and non-resident aliens. This would not be a major
problem since it merely involves proof of residence.
II. THE BRUNETTE DECISION: PERPETUATION
OF THE PRESUMPTION
In the recent case of Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v.
Kockum Industries, Inc.,2" the United States Supreme Court
echoed the line of decisions based upon the presumption that
aliens do not reside in any district for venue purposes. A British
Columbia corporation was charged with patent infringement in
the United States District Court of Oregon by an Alabama corpo-
ration doing business in Oregon. The complaint was dismissed on
the ground of improper venue. 29  The District Court determined
that section 1400(b) of the United States Code" was the exclu-
sive provision governing venue in patent infringement litigation.
Section 1400(b) provides:
Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in
the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a reg-
ular and established place of business.81
The Canadian corporation did not "reside" in Oregon because
section 1400(b) makes the residence of a corporation its place of
jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of dif-
ferent states, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either
the plaintiff or the defendant ....
28. 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
29. Brunette Machine Works Ltd. v. Kockum Industries Inc., Civil No.
69-42 (D. Ore. Feb. 20, 1969).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1948).
31. Id.
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incorporation; nor did the defendant have a regular place of busi-
ness in Oregon even though the infringements were claimed to have
occurred there. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the District Court on appeal 2 by holding that
section 1391(d) applies to aliens in all cases.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court opinion and
cited the development of federal alien venue law in rendering its
decision. 33  Section 1391(d) has its origins in the Judiciary Act
of 178911 which implied that aliens would be subject to suit in
any district. Although the general venue provisions referred to
"inhabitants," this was not meant to include aliens.3 5 The Judi-
ciary Act was later revised in 1875 and the word "person" was
substituted for "inhabitant. '36  Several years later In re Hohorst
held that this revision was not meant to be a substantive change
of the law and, therefore, aliens were not brought within the gen-
eral venue provisions. The Supreme Court based its decision
on the presumption which remains the law today, that aliens do not
reside in any district for venue purposes.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Court in Ho-
horst was well aware of the deficiencies inherent in the presump-
tion that aliens do not reside in any district of the United States.
Even more significant is the fact that Hohorst was recently ex-
amined by the Court in Brunette and the presumption was again
given endorsement. The Court in Brunette cited two reasons
which were the basis of the decision in Hohorst; the second indi-
cates the point that both courts must have been aware of the inac-
curacy of their presumption.
Second, and perhaps more important, to hold the venue
statutes applicable to suits against aliens would be in effect
to oust the federal courts of jurisdiction in most cases, be-
cause the general venue provisions were framed with refer-
ence to the defendant's place of residence or citizenship,
32. 442 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1971).
33. 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
34. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, para. 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79: "[No civil
suit shall be brought . . . against an inhabitant of the United States, by any
original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in
which he shall be found .. "
35. In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 659-62 (1893).
36. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, para. 1, 18 Stat. 470.
37. 150 U.S. 653 (1893).
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and an alien defendant is by definition a citizen of no dis-
trict. 88
The significance of this statement is that while the general
venue provisions were said to be based upon either the defend-
ant's place of residence or citizenship, the Court then stated merely
that an alien is by definition a "citizen" of no district, conspicu-
ously failing to indicate whether or not and alien may be a "res-
ident" of any district.
The Court's language in Hohorst indicates that it may have
chosen to sidestep a very difficult question when rendering its de-
cision. In Brunette, the Court failed to criticize the faultiness
of the Hohorst logic. Section 139i (d) may have been appropriate
for the circumstances in Brunette but this does not excuse the present
Court for failing to confront the problem and for endorsing such
an inaccurate presumption. The language in Brunette implicitly
recognized the need to distinguish between resident and non-
resident aliens in federal venue cases.
The Court in Brunette offered a somewhat paradoxical ra-
tionale for its adoption of the reasoning in the Hohorst decision:
"the venue provisions are designed not to keep suits out of the
federal courts, but merely to allocate suits to the most appropriate
or convenient federal forum."39  According to the Court's lan-
guage, given the presumption that aliens do not reside in any
district, the law must be that aliens can be sued in any district
or else federal courts will lose jurisdiction. It is submitted that
to require an alien resident to respond in any district at the
whim of the plaintiff fails to consider the "convenience" of the
alien.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 1391 (d)
Although the fourteenth amendment does not apply to fed-
eral statutes, the federal government is not allowed to discrimi-
nate merely because it is not bound by an equal protection
clause.40  The Supreme Court focused upon the fact that the
fifth amendment lacks an equal protection clause in Boiling v.
Sharpe,4 which struck down the District of Columbia's public
38. Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries Inc., 406 U.S. 706,
709 (1972).
39. ld. at 710.
40. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
41. Id.
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school segregation, where it stated that "it would be unthinkable
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the fed-
eral government."42 The Court went on to say:
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of
Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does
the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the States.
But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mu-
tually exclusive. The "equal protection" of the laws is a more
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process
of law", and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are
always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recog-
nized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be vio-
lative of due process. 4
3
In accordance with the reasoning in Bolling, the same stand-
ards applied in state cases involving the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause should be carried over to federal equal
protection problems and, specifically, to the statute under discus-
sion, section 1391(d).
In the recent United States Supreme Court case of Graham v.
Richardson," the Court considered an Arizona welfare statute
which conditioned benefits on United States citizenship, or fif-
teen years residence in the United States. For the first time, the
Court applied strict judicial scrutiny to alien rights based upon
the "inherently suspect"4 nature of the classification in holding
that the statute violated the fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion clause.46  Thus, aliens joined company with such other sub-
jects of classification as race and poverty under this high stand-
ard of review. It is significant to note that the Court could have
decided the case on the grounds that the statute violated the fun-
damental right to travel47 in that it tended to influence aliens
against moving to Arizona. Instead, the Court chose to confront
the classification and held that classifications based upon alien-
age are inherently suspect.
Now that classifications affecting aliens are inherently sus-
pect, the question remains whether there is a compelling govern-
42. Id. at 500.
43. Id. at 499.
44. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
45. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
46. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
47. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
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mental interest which could justify the continued existence of sec-
tion 1391(d). This path of logic leads back to the presumption
that aliens do not reside in any district for venue purposes. Un-
til this presumption is discarded, it will remain as the justification
for section 1391(d) and, presumably, the "compelling state in-
terest" standard will be satisfied.
IV. CONCLUSION
The present federal policy toward alien venue is based upon
a presumption which has withstood challenges throughout the
history of this country. It is time that the federal courts, or
Congress, direct their attention to a very real question which is
implicit in the presumption, what is to be done with the aliens who
do in fact "reside" in the United States? Although it would be
preferable that even non-resident aliens receive better federal
venue treatment, certainly resident aliens do not deserve the po-
tential burden placed upon them by section 1391(d). Concur-
rent with the inconvenience to the alien, constitutional and in-
ternational issues raised by section 1391(d) must be answered.
John M. Lefler
9
Lefler: Federal Venue For Aliens: The Presumption of Nonresidency
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1973
